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When Does ICT-Enabled Citizen 
Voice Lead to Government 
Responsiveness?
Tiago Peixoto and Jonathan Fox*
Abstract This article reviews evidence on the use of 23 information and 
communications technology (ICT) platforms to project citizen voice to 
improve public service delivery. This meta-analysis focuses on empirical 
studies of initiatives in the global South, highlighting both citizen 
uptake (‘yelp’) and the degree to which public service providers respond 
to expressions of citizen voice (‘teeth’). The conceptual framework 
distinguishes two roles played by ICT-enabled citizen voice: informing 
upwards accountability, and bolstering downwards accountability through 
either individual user feedback or collective civic action. This distinction 
between the ways in which ICT platforms mediate the relationship 
between citizens and service providers allows for a precise analytical 
focus on how different dimensions of such platforms contribute to public 
sector responsiveness. These cases suggest that while ICT platforms have 
been relevant in increasing policymakers’ and senior managers’ capacity to 
respond, most of them have yet to influence their willingness to do so.
1 Introduction
Around the world, civil society organisations (CSOs) and governments 
are experimenting with information and communications technology 
(ICT) platforms that try to encourage and project citizen voice, with the 
goal of  improving public service delivery. This meta-analysis focuses 
on empirical studies of  initiatives in the global South, highlighting both 
citizen uptake (‘yelp’) and the degree to which public service providers 
respond to expressions of  citizen voice (‘teeth’). The conceptual 
framework is informed by the key distinction between two distinct 
genres of  ICT-enabled citizen voice – aggregated individual assessments 
of  service provision and collective civic action. The first approach 
constitutes user feedback, providing precise information in real time to 
decision-makers. This allows policymakers and programme managers to 
identify and address service delivery problems – but at their discretion. 
Collective civic action, in contrast, can encourage service providers to 
become more publicly accountable – an approach that depends less 
exclusively on decision-makers’ discretion about whether or not to act 
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on the information embodied in feedback. This conceptual distinction 
between two different ways in which ICT platforms mediate the citizen–
service provider relationship allows for a more precise analytical focus 
on how different dimensions of  these ICT platforms contribute to 
public sector responsiveness.
This study begins with a conceptual framework intended to clarify the 
different links in the causal chain in between ICT-enabled opportunities 
to express voice (platforms) and institutional responses. In other words, 
how and why are these platforms supposed to leverage responses from 
service providers? The answers turn out not to be so obvious. Our 
approach was informed by a close review of  the available evidence, 
primarily quantitative, about experiences with 23 ICT platforms in 
17 countries.1 This focus on unpacking causal chains is informed by 
two factors. First, the broader literature on the drivers of  accountability 
increasingly emphasises using causal chains to address the analytical 
puzzle of  how to distinguish how and why citizen action may or may 
not lead to public sector response (Fox 2014; Grandvoinnet, Aslam 
and Raha 2015; Joshi 2014; Peixoto 2013). Second, analysis revealed 
that we do not see a generic type of  platform leading to a generic type 
of  response. Instead, we see key differences in the institutional (not 
technological) design of  the interface that may be relevant for voice, 
citizen action and institutional response. The evidence so far indicates 
that most of  the ICT platforms that manage to leverage responsiveness 
somehow directly involve government.
While ICT-enabled voice platforms vary widely across many dimensions, 
this analysis emphasises several differences that are hypothesised to 
influence both citizen uptake and institutional response. These include 
the degree of  public access to information about the expression of  voice 
– does the public see what the public says? Does the ICT platform 
document and disclose how the public sector responds? They also include 
institutional mechanisms for public sector response – do the agencies or 
organisations take specific offline actions to prompt service providers’ 
response? As a first step towards homing in on these variables, this article 
maps the 23 platforms studied in terms of  various empirical indicators 
of  these distinct dynamics. This exercise is followed by a discussion of  
propositions that may or may not link voice to institutional response.
Note that this study does not focus on two ways in which service delivery 
agencies use ICT that are very relevant for understanding their full 
array of  relationships with users. First, many public agencies are using 
mobile phones and social media to disseminate information efficiently. 
However, if  those interfaces are one-way (‘inside-out’, or ‘top-down’), 
then they do not ‘count’ as ICT-enabled citizen voice for the purposes 
of  this study. Second, agencies can use ICT for internal administrative 
reforms that can bolster their capacity to respond to citizen concerns 
– by reducing the discretionary power of  front-line providers through 
increasing the capacity of  managers to monitor service provider 
performance, as well as by helping consistently track whether and 
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how problems are being addressed. This study covers evidence of  
institutional response to ICT-enabled systems for users to exercise voice, 
rather than the broader set of  cases of  relevant e-government initiatives.
2 The conceptual map: unpacking digital engagement
The broader analytical context for this article involves three 
simultaneous trends in the literature on the role of  information in 
leveraging public accountability. First, the number and diversity of  
practitioner-led digital engagement for service delivery initiatives 
continues to grow, involving both effervescent experimentation and 
efforts to scale up. Experimentation with social accountability tools has 
been growing within the portfolios of  both large public and private aid 
donors for the past decade, and some involve ICT. For instance, many 
World Bank projects with ‘identifiable beneficiaries’ now include some 
kind of  feedback mechanism, and citizen engagement has become a 
policy framework which includes the use of  ICT (World Bank 2014a). 
Major private donors, such as the Omidyar Network and Google, are 
also making significant investments to encourage ‘civic technology’ – 
in both the global North and South. New donor partnerships are also 
encouraging experimentation with civic technology in very low-income 
countries, led most notably by Making All Voices Count.2
Second, while growing media coverage of  ICT-enabled voice platforms 
is often enthusiastic, social science research on the dynamics and impacts 
of  these initiatives lags far behind, and the limited existing evidence 
does not yet support unqualified optimism.3 This study is distinctive in 
that it draws on a recent round of  unusually comprehensive empirical 
studies that involve both large-scale surveys and access to government 
agency data. This new research suggests that the key dynamics that 
drive both voice and institutional response may be different from some 
of  the widely held impressions projected by the media, donors and 
platform developers. Take, for example, the case of  the Kenyan urban 
water agency’s MajiVoice (see also Welle, Williams and Pearce, this 
IDS Bulletin), a large-scale user-feedback system widely presented as an 
ICT-enabled voice platform. Recent surveys find significant evidence 
of  institutional response, grounded in an effective complaint tracking 
system – yet three quarters of  the complaints are filed in person, 21 per 
cent by phone and less than 3 per cent by Short Message Service (SMS) 
or online (Belcher and Abreu-Lopes 2016, forthcoming).
Third, the focus on the potential for citizen voice to improve public 
service delivery involves at least four distinct yet overlapping arenas 
of  practice – the open data movement, open government reforms, 
anti-corruption efforts and social accountability initiatives. In spite 
of  the apparent new policy consensus that all these good things 
go together, in practice, the limited synergy between these distinct 
approaches suggests that the whole is still not greater than the sum 
of  the parts (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). Most of  these 
governance reform approaches rely heavily on the potential power of  
information to stimulate voice, yet they assign information different 
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roles. There are several conceptual challenges involved in specifying 
the causal mechanisms that may link voice and institutional response 
– aside from the empirical questions involved (documenting uptake is 
more straightforward than institutional response). The first analytical 
challenge is to disentangle voice from responsiveness. Much of  the first 
wave of  research on ICT-enabled voice platforms focuses primarily 
on citizen uptake (e.g. Gigler and Bailur 2014), without clear evidence 
that the feedback loop actually closes. In practice, the concept of  the 
feedback loop is often used to imply that uptake (e.g. citizen usage 
of  crowd-sourced platforms to report feedback) necessarily leads to 
positive institutional responses. In other words, there is a high degree 
of  optimism embedded in the way the concept tends to be used. In 
contrast, the framework proposed here avoids this assumption by 
treating the degree of  institutional response as an open question.
The second conceptual challenge is to specify the relationship between 
the role of  ICT-enabled voice platforms and the broader question of  
the relationship between transparency and accountability. In spite of  the 
widely held view that ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’, the empirical 
literature on the relationship between transparency and accountability is 
far from clear (Fox 2007; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Peixoto 2013). The 
assumed causal mechanism is that transparency will inform and stimulate 
collective action, which in turn will provoke an appropriate institutional 
response (Brockmyer and Fox 2015; Fox 2014).4 In this model, both 
analysts and practitioners have only just begun to spell out the process 
behind that collective action (Fung, Graham and Weil 2007; Joshi 2014; 
Lieberman, Posner and Tsai 2014). In light of  widely held unrealistic 
expectations about the ‘power of  sunshine’, convincing propositions 
about the causal mechanisms involved need to specify how and why the 
availability of  an ICT platform (1) would motivate citizen action and  
(2) why the resulting user feedback would motivate improvements in 
service provision. After all, decision-makers’ lack of  information about 
problems is not the only cause of  low-quality service provision.
Third, the relationship between ICT-enabled voice platforms and the 
transparency/accountability question is complicated by the fact that, in 
practice, a significant subset of  those platforms does not publicly disclose 
the user feedback. Yet if  citizen voice is not made visible to other citizens, 
where does its leverage come from? Such feedback systems aggregate 
data – by asking citizens to share their assessments of  service provision – 
but if  the resulting information is not made public, then it cannot inform 
citizen action. In these systems, if  users’ input is going to influence 
service provision, voice must activate ‘teeth’ through a process other than 
public transparency – such as the use of  data dashboards that inform 
senior managers’ discretionary application of  administrative discipline.
These conceptual propositions suggest that it is relevant to distinguish 
explicitly between two different accountability pathways that link voice 
and ‘teeth’ – shorthand for institutional willingness and capacity to 
respond (Fox 2014). In downwards accountability relationships, service 
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providers are held accountable by citizen voice and action. The arrow 
of  answerability points downwards, insofar as it is driven by the 
potential political cost to policymakers of  not responding to a publicly 
visible concern. In contrast, in upwards accountability relationships, front-
line and middle-level service providers are held accountable to senior 
policymakers and programme managers, who use the user information 
to take administrative action. The arrow of  answerability points 
upwards. In this approach, the incentives for policymakers to act on 
user information are less clear. Clearly, both mechanisms can operate 
together, but they are empirically and analytically distinct (see Table 1).
Based on these conceptual propositions, this review of  23 ICT-enabled 
voice platforms distinguishes between two different types of  citizen 
voice, ‘user feedback’ and ‘civic action’. While these two approaches 
can overlap in practice, they are analytically distinct. Their common 
denominator is the use of  dedicated ICT platforms to solicit and collect 
feedback on public service delivery. The differences between them 
involve three dimensions: (1) whether the feedback provided is disclosed; 
(2) through which pathway individual or collective citizens’ preferences 
and views are expressed; and (3) whether these mechanisms tend to 
promote downwards or upwards accountability. Note that this analytical 
approach differs from the World Bank’s current policy framework, 
which considers user feedback to be a variant of  ‘citizen engagement’ 
(World Bank 2014a). The approach proposed here, in contrast, does not 
treat the adjectives ‘citizen’ and ‘civic’ as pure synonyms (though they 
overlap). We use citizen (as in ‘citizen voice’) to refer to individual,  
non-public actions, while civic refers to public, collective actions.5 The 
two approaches are potentially mutually reinforcing and in practice, 
some voice platforms combine them (see Figure 1).
With regard to the first dimension, we will assess cases in terms of  the 
extent to which the feedback provided by individuals is publicly disclosed 
or not, thus enabling citizens to potentially act to hold governments 
Table 1 How does voice trigger teeth? Upwards and downwards accountability
Primary causal mechanism
Voice pathway Upwards accountability Downwards accountability
Individual user feedback
From front-line service 
providers to managers and 
policymakers by identifying 
problems and triggering 
administrative action
Collective civic action
From public sector to 
society, by bringing external 
pressure to bear and raising 
the political cost of  
non-responsiveness
Source Authors’ own.
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accountable. Citizens’ capacity to hold governments accountable 
depends, among other things, on the accessibility of  publicly available 
relevant and actionable information (Fung, Graham and Weil 2007). 
In this respect, whether the feedback provided by citizens on service 
delivery is publicised or not is directly related to the extent to which 
citizens can hold governments accountable for their performance 
and actions. Thus, a first distinction between user feedback and civic 
engagement is that, while a growing number of  ICT platforms collect 
input from individuals, only user feedback that is made public counts 
here as civic engagement (in Figure 1, this is the area of  overlap between 
the two circles, involving both individual feedback and public disclosure).
For instance, in the case of  the Punjab Proactive Governance model, 
the government solicits feedback via mobile phones on the quality of  
services provided on a large scale, on an ongoing basis (Bhatti, Zall 
Kusek and Verheijen 2015). However, the feedback provided is not 
disclosed to the public, only to senior policymakers, as it is intended 
to inform internal administrative monitoring processes. This process 
does not contribute to citizens’ ability to act based on the feedback. In 
contrast, Uruguay’s Por Mi Barrio is a mobile and web-based platform 
that enables Montevideo’s citizens to report problems like vandalism 
and breakdowns of  public infrastructure. The problems reported, and 
the actions taken in response by government (e.g. repaired, or not), are 
displayed on a map on the public website. Not only is the government 
able to act on citizen reports, the publication of  the feedback makes it 
possible for citizens to hold governments accountable.
The second dimension that we use to categorise platforms assesses the 
mechanisms by which citizens’ views and preferences are expressed – 
either individually or collectively. Individualised mechanisms refer to 
those that do not involve collective action, yet the feedback provided by 
a single individual is expected to trigger a response, possibly through 
aggregation in order to identify problem areas in public service delivery. 
Undisclosed Public
Figure 1 Unpacking user feedback and civic action: difference and overlap
Source Authors’ own.
Individual Collective
Citizen  
Engagement
User feedback Civic action
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This is the case, for instance, of  web-based citizen reporting initiatives 
such as Por Mi Barrio, FixMyStreet in Georgia and I Paid a Bribe in 
India. In these cases, each individual report of  very specific service issues 
needing attention is assumed to be enough to lead to a governmental 
response. In contrast, collective mechanisms refer to those in which 
it is the magnitude, nature and intensity of  the aggregation of  citizen 
concerns that is expected to trigger governmental action. Examples of  
platforms for collective voice include online petitions such as Change.
org and mobile and web-voting in Brazil’s state-wide Rio Grande do Sul 
participatory budgeting (PB) process. In both initiatives, it is the collective 
Box 1 Whose voices are they? 
Whose voices are expressing themselves on ICT-enabled 
governmental service delivery feedback platforms? What 
kinds of  bias may be involved? ICT platforms can potentially 
select for some kinds of  responses over others. This can 
happen in at least two distinct ways – differential access to 
communication of  feedback, and categorisation of  user input 
that pre-selects for certain categories. 
First, the subset of  citizens who engage with ICT systems 
may or may not represent the concerns of  those citizens 
who lack ICT access, such as rural women or people 
without access to formal education. This is the case with 
UR’s U-Reporters, one quarter of  whom are government 
employees (Mellon, Peixoto and Sjoberg 2015), and who 
under-represent the low-income, rural citizens who are most 
in need of  public services. Indeed, the whole notion of  user 
feedback suggests that the target group is limited to those 
citizens who ostensibly should have access but have problems 
in practice – such as those who have a water connection, but 
lack water. This implicit framing excludes those who are not 
included in water systems, clinics, schools or public security 
in the first place – and therefore not considered ‘users’. 
Second, as citizen concerns are input into government 
agency data systems for aggregation and transmission 
upwards to senior managers, administrative legibility requires 
them to be categorised into lists of  pre-existing categories, 
which may also select for some kinds of  citizen priorities 
to the exclusion of  others – as in the case of  issues that are 
priorities for low-income urban women, as Ranganathan 
found in her study of  e-redressal systems in Karnataka 
(2012). To sum up, the framing of  the main questions 
addressed in this study – whether or not ICT service delivery 
feedback platforms lead to uptake, and whether or not such 
voice in turn leads to service delivery response – does not 
address two relevant questions: whose voice is projected, and 
how inclusive the feedback agenda is.
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mobilisation around a cause or preference that is intended to trigger 
government responsiveness. The core of  the technological platforms that 
support these mechanisms lies in the reduction of  transaction costs for 
collective action that can address policy agenda-setting, in contrast to 
reacting to policy outputs. This collective dimension, we argue, is what 
gives the character of  ‘civic-ness’ to ICT-enabled voice platforms, insofar 
as they enable individuals to engage in collective action – or at least to 
address public concerns. In contrast to feedback systems that receive 
individual reactions to specific service delivery problems, ICT platforms 
that enable the public aggregation of  citizens’ views have more potential 
to constitute input into the setting of  broader policy priorities. This 
potential civic agenda-setting contribution goes beyond the conventional 
understanding of  feedback, in which the agendas that citizens are 
supposed to respond to are set from above (see Box 1).
Thus, our conceptual distinction can be summarised as follows: citizen 
feedback initiatives provide feedback from individual clients of  services. 
Where such feedback is not publicly disclosed, the causal pathway to 
governmental response is via upwards accountability, from front-line and 
mid-level public servants to senior managers and policymakers. Conversely, 
civic engagement refers to mechanisms where the feedback is publicly 
disclosed, which allows for collective action and downwards accountability 
to also take place. Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual model.
On the left side of  Figure 1 (light grey) feedback is individual and 
undisclosed, which we can describe as a typical case of  governmental 
user-feedback platforms. On the right side (dark grey), citizen voice is 
simultaneously collective and disclosed, meeting the two criteria for 
our definition of  civic engagement. At the intersection point, however, 
we find platforms that both collect individually specific feedback and 
make those inputs public (sometimes also reporting whether and how 
the government responds). This overlap involves the fact that, while 
individualised feedback mechanisms are not designed to spur online 
collective action within the platform itself, the fact that the feedback is 
publicised may inform and facilitate collective action – offline as well as 
online. This may be the case, for instance, when the sum of  individual 
feedback in a certain platform, such as FixMyStreet, reveals to the 
public the patterns of  failure in a certain service, or in certain locations. 
In this case, even though the platform is not specifically designed to 
support collective action, the disclosure of  evidence of  patterns of  
failure in a given service may support well-targeted collective action to 
address service delivery problems.
Figure 2 presents the diagram populated with the cases we analyse 
in this study. The platforms that generated a high degree of  tangible 
response from the service delivery agencies are indicated in black (7 of  
23). High responsiveness to citizen voice is measured here as tangible 
service delivery agency action, registered in more than half  of  cases. In 
eight cases, user uptake was high – though only three of  these were also 
among the eight cases of  high responsiveness.
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As shown in Figure 2, approximately a quarter of  the cases are found 
in the user-feedback category, another quarter in the civic action 
category, and 14 of  23 at the intersection between those two, called 
citizen engagement here. The cases in the user-feedback category are 
mostly web- and mobile-based systems for collecting citizen views on 
the provision of  services in a specific sector, such as electricity, water 
and health. Here the service provider plays either a passive or an active 
role in the collection of  feedback. In the first role, the citizen voluntarily 
initiates the contact to report an issue with public services via mobile- or 
web-based systems – sometimes in combination with offline, face-to-face 
citizen attention windows (as in the case of  MajiVoice in Kenya). One 
large-scale example in this category is Lapor, Indonesia’s complaints 
handling system, which allows citizens to submit their reports on issues 
ranging from teacher absenteeism to damaged roads through a number 
of  channels which include SMS, mobile apps and social media.
The user-feedback category also includes a second mechanism by 
which data is collected, which we call ‘proactive listening’ – also 
called ‘proactive feedback’ by its practitioners (Bhatti, Zall Kusek and 
Verheijen 2015; Masud 2015). Here, government service providers 
proactively reach out to citizens in order to gather feedback from them 
on the quality of  services received. This mechanism is best illustrated by 
Punjab’s Citizen Feedback Model, where a system generates SMS and 
calls to public service users in order to ask them about satisfaction with 
the services received and potential corruption incidents. The Punjab 
government has deployed this approach on an unprecedentedly massive 
scale, with more than 6 million outreach calls so far. Recent large-scale 
surveys of  service users have found that these outreach efforts actually 
reached and received responses from 15 per cent of  citizens called 
Figure 2 Mapping citizen voice platforms and degrees of institutional responsiveness
Source Authors’ own.
l MajiVoice
l Rio 1746
l Punjab Proactive
m My Voice
m Karnataka BVS
l Proactive Listening Electricity
l Lungisa
l I Change My City
l Por Mi Barrio
l Maji Matone
m I Paid a Bribe
m Check My School
m Lapor
m Huduma
m IMCO
m e-Chautari
m Barrios Digital
l Digital State Participatory 
 Budgeting
l Pressure Pan
l Change.org
m U-Report
Degree of 
institutional 
responsiveness
l High
l Medium
m Low
Citizen  
Engagement
User feedback Civic action
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(Bayern 2015; World Bank 2015). EDE Este, an electricity distribution 
company in the Dominican Republic, also does large-scale, proactive 
surveys of  its service users. The initiative combines a traditional 
complaints handling mechanism with proactive outreach to users. 
This online/mobile phone platform allows citizens to report problems 
with electricity services, ranging from malfunctioning connections to 
bribe requests by maintenance crews. Following the handling of  the 
complaint (e.g. re-connection of  electricity), the company proactively 
re-contacts a random sample of  users to gather feedback on the quality 
of  services provided. The feedback received is systematically used to 
inform sanctions (e.g. administrative procedures) and rewards (e.g. 
performance-related wage bonuses for company workers). Since its 
implementation in 2011, the initiative has recorded growing resolution 
rates of  reported issues, with close to 100 per cent of  the feedback 
provided indicating good or excellent levels of  satisfaction.6 The average 
of  instances of  disrespectful treatment of  clients registered at the 
beginning of  the project was drastically reduced, and reported cases of  
corruption fell by 70 per cent.
The majority of  platforms make their citizen feedback public (18 of  23). 
Out of  the five that do not disclose the feedback, two are governmental 
and three involve donor agencies in collaboration with governments. 
Conversely, all of  the CSO-driven initiatives publicise the input given 
by citizens. This finding makes particular sense if  one considers the 
directionality of  accountability relations. User-feedback initiatives (i.e. 
not disclosed) are more likely to be implemented by governments 
or donors, where service providers are held accountable to a higher 
authority (upwards accountability). Conversely, given that CSOs have 
few means to hold providers directly accountable, they rely essentially 
on downwards accountability mechanisms, where the driving force of  
institutional responsiveness – at least hypothetically – is the exposure of  
the behaviour of  service providers vis-à-vis citizens. No pattern seems 
to emerge when looking at disclosure of  feedback and institutional 
responsiveness, however. In user-feedback initiatives (where feedback is 
not disclosed and there is no collective action), the four cases are equally 
split between low and high levels of  institutional responsiveness. A 
similar pattern emerges when examining citizen engagement initiatives: 
public disclosure of  feedback does not seem to lead – per se – to 
increased responsiveness from providers.
In 14 cases, the provision of  input through the dedicated platform is 
complemented by some type of  offline action to prompt governments to 
respond and/or to monitor government responsiveness. This is the case, 
for instance, of  the Rio Grande do Sul PB process, in which citizens 
are periodically elected to monitor the implementation of  investments 
prioritised through a voting process (Spada et al. 2015). In MajiVoice, 
the responsiveness of  the water service agency is actively monitored 
by the members of  the Water Services Regulatory Board, which can 
trigger legal actions against service providers when they fail to meet 
pre-established quality standards (Belcher and Abreu-Lopes 2016, 
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forthcoming). Yet, offline action does not seem to ensure responsiveness 
by itself, as illustrated by the cases of  e-Chautari in Nepal and Barrios 
Digital in Bolivia. However, among the 14 cases, the evidence is 
insufficient to verify that the intensity and regularity of  these offline 
actions varies.
In the category of  civic action initiatives, where response involves online 
collective action, we find four different cases, with varying degrees of  
institutional responsiveness. The Rio Grande do Sul Digital PB process 
has a high level of  institutional responsiveness, while the online petition 
platform Change.org and the Brazilian initiative Pressure Pan both have 
medium levels. A possible explanation of  the different responsiveness 
levels is the difference in institutional design. Digital PB in Rio Grande 
do Sul is a governmental initiative mandated by state legislation. As 
such, all of  the citizen-generated social investment proposals that are 
approved through the participatory process are officially included in 
the state’s budget, with a number of  them effectively carried out by the 
state government.7 The other two initiatives are platforms that allow 
any citizen to initiate collective action to petition or exert pressure on 
the government to take an action towards any public agenda. This 
open-endedness means that the platforms can launch both some actions 
that trigger extensive uptake and mobilisations, and many that fail to 
generate follow-up. This potential for a large denominator, in terms of  
the total number of  initiatives, would affect the overall percentage of  
petitions that trigger responsiveness. Indeed, some data seems to suggest 
the importance of  mobilisation capacity: online petitions on  
Change.org are substantively more likely to be successful when 
sponsored by an organisation (World Bank 2015), and citizen 
campaigns through Pressure Pan are three times more likely to succeed 
when receiving mobilisation support from Pressure Pan’s staff. This 
evidence resonates with the proposition that the effectiveness of  digital 
technologies in social mobilisation depends on offline structures of  
organisation and influence (Fung, Gilman and Shkabatur 2013). Finally, 
we find the widely recognised case of  U-Report (UR) in Uganda, with 
low level of  institutional responsiveness, which we shall discuss later.
In terms of  the institutional actors that drive the voice initiatives, 12 are 
led by CSOs, six by governments, and five by donors. Out of  the seven 
initiatives with high levels of  responsiveness, four are government-led 
and three CSO-led. Civil society and governments seem equally capable 
of  creating platforms and processes that engender responsiveness. 
However, the three CSO high-response initiatives all share a common 
trait in that they involve partnerships with government. In other words, 
in all of  the cases of  high institutional responsiveness, the government 
is either leading the process or plays the role of  a partner. However, not 
all of  the initiatives involving government–CSO partnerships led to high 
levels of  institutional responsiveness, as illustrated by the cases of  I Paid 
a Bribe and Check My School, both of  which had low percentages 
of  issues raised by citizens that led to documented agency responses. 
Seen together, these findings seem to suggest that while partnership 
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with government is not a sufficient condition for the responsiveness 
of  CSO-led initiatives, it may well be an enabling one. Finally, while 
the initiatives showing medium and high degrees of  institutional 
responsiveness involve both CSO and government-driven efforts, we 
find no donor-driven platforms that led to institutional responsiveness. 
While we do not claim our sample to be representative and the results 
may be skewed due to the small number of  donor-driven cases analysed, 
these patterns suggest future research paths, focusing on the role that 
different drivers may play in institutional responsiveness.
When examining uptake, citizen use of  platforms (an output) should 
not be equated with institutional responsiveness (an outcome). This 
sample includes significant cases that combined high uptake with low 
responsiveness. The case of  UR, UNICEF’s social monitoring system for 
young Ugandans, provides compelling evidence for this point. Created 
in 2007, this SMS-based platform runs weekly polls with registered users 
on a broad range of  issues (e.g. child marriage, access to education). To 
inform public debate, the results of  the polls are widely disseminated 
through the project’s website and diverse mass media outlets, including 
a variety of  formats such as newspaper articles, radio shows and even 
a documentary broadcast on major Ugandan TV channels. Members 
of  Parliament (MPs) are UR’s main policy audience. Aligned with a 
vision of  real-time data collection to inform policymaking that goes 
beyond sending weekly newsletters with poll results to MPs, UNICEF 
also provides MPs with access to the platform to reach out to their 
audiences. The number of  registered users (U-Reporters) has grown 
steadily since its launch, recently reaching more than 299,000 (Bayern 
2015; World Bank 2015). UNICEF describes UR as a ‘“killer app” 
for communication towards achieving equitable outcomes for children 
and their families’ (UNICEF 2012). This enthusiastic view of  UR has 
resonated in development circles, with the free SMS-based platform 
currently being rolled out in countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, the 
Democratic Republic of  Congo, South Sudan, Nigeria and Mexico.
Uptake is not a problem for UR in terms of  numbers, and it leverages 
the potential of  mobile phones as a means to ‘listen at scale’. However, 
47 per cent of  UR participants have some university education and one 
quarter are government employees, raising questions about whose voices 
are being projected (see Box 1). Furthermore, until recently very little 
was known about the extent to which UR’s take-up was translated into 
any type of  institutional responsiveness. A new detailed evaluation of  
UR finds no systematic evidence of  UR affecting policy, let alone MPs’ 
behaviour in terms of  representation, legislation and oversight (Berdou 
and Abreu-Lopes 2015). UR emerges thus as a significant case that 
illustrates the need to separate uptake (as an output), from institutional 
responsiveness (as an outcome).
To conclude the discussion of  these empirical findings, one of  the most 
noticeable patterns is the existence of  numerous digital engagement 
initiatives that meet dead ends despite different pathways – at least in 
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the relatively short run. The majority of  the 23 cases studied led to low 
levels of  institutional responsiveness, with 11 reporting medium to high 
levels (defined conservatively as leading to at least 20 per cent response 
rates). Notably, the multiple dead ends do not seem to be motivated by 
the absence of  any one specific factor. None of  these variables appear to 
be a sufficient condition for institutional responsiveness, suggesting that 
none of  these factors can be considered as a ‘magic bullet’. The findings 
suggest multiple pathways to institutional responsiveness – involving the 
convergence of  multiple, mutually reinforcing factors. If  one factor does 
stand out, however, it is government involvement, insofar as four of  the 
six cases of  government-led voice platforms were associated with high 
rates of  service delivery responsiveness.
3 Conclusion
This study reviewed cases of  ICT-enabled voice platforms where evidence 
of  institutional response was available. As suggested in our introduction, 
in the ‘yelp’ feedback loop model, proponents tend to assume that user 
feedback to identify service delivery problems is sufficient to induce 
service providers to respond. This review of  the evidence from 23 
ICT-enabled platforms finds that this implicit market model, in which 
(individual) demands for good services produces its own supply, is not 
sufficient to leverage institutional response. That leaves open the question 
of  what determines the ‘supply’ of  institutional responsiveness, and how 
ICT-enabled voice platforms can make a difference.
The determinants of  service provider agency responsiveness to citizen 
feedback can be understood as involving both willingness and capacity. 
The first refers to intent and motivations, the second refers to the 
leverage provided by institutional tools to translate that into actual 
practices. In some cases, institutional design8 and a strong sense of  
commitment to organisational mission at the top encourage willingness 
to respond. In these cases, the key role of  ICT platforms is to bolster 
capacity to respond – as with MajiVoice’s water provision in Kenya. 
Some policymakers may come from professions with a strong sense 
of  mission, while others may be more concerned about the potential 
political risk associated with dissatisfied citizens. Systematic collection of  
feedback, if  it reveals both the depth and breadth of  citizen concern, can 
appeal to either set of  motivations – professional commitment to mission, 
or political risk aversion. These two sets of  motivations for responsiveness 
do not appear to be directly influenced by ICT voice platforms.
In contrast, the determinants of  senior manager capacity to respond 
to citizen voice are different. Platforms’ institutional and technical 
design features will determine the precision with which user problems 
are identified, which is crucial to identify which service providers 
are responsible. The cases studied suggest that it is crucial for user 
complaints to be routed to entities within the service providing agency 
that have some incentive and capacity to respond. Specifically, 
experiences with the most high-impact platforms, such as the Dominican 
electricity agency and MajiVoice in Kenya, suggest that direct links 
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between governmental feedback reception systems and internal work 
order systems greatly increase policymakers’ capacity to determine 
whether and how complaints have been resolved, which appears to be 
a necessary condition for effective institutional response. Similarly, two 
of  the most successful CSO platforms – Por Mi Barrio in Uruguay and 
I Change My City in India – are connected to existing governmental 
service provider complaint systems. These are examples of  the 
institutional questions that play crucial roles as intervening variables 
that shape whether or not voice triggers teeth to act. The proposition 
that emerges here is that regardless of  their motivations, policymakers 
with a commitment to bolstering institutional responsiveness should in 
principle have an incentive to: (1) institute tracking systems that directly 
link complaints to institutional responses and (2) to publicly disclose both 
citizen feedback and data regarding institutional response – in order to 
both inform and validate subsequent citizen action, and to potentially 
‘name and shame’ non-performing units with their agency.
To conclude, the empirical evidence available so far about the degree 
to which voice can trigger teeth indicates that service delivery user 
feedback has so far been most relevant where it increases the capacity 
of  policymakers and senior managers to respond. It appears that 
dedicated ICT-enabled voice platforms – with a few exceptions – have 
yet to influence their willingness. Where senior managers are already 
committed to learning from feedback and using it to bolster their 
capacity to get agencies to respond, ICT platforms can make a big 
difference. In that sense, ICT can make a technical contribution to a 
policy problem that to some degree has already been addressed.
In summary, ICT platforms can bolster upwards accountability if  they 
link citizen voice to policymaker capacity to see and respond to service 
delivery problems. This matters when policymakers already care. Where 
the challenge is how to get policymakers to care in the first place, then 
the question is how ICT platforms can bolster downwards accountability 
by enabling the collective action needed to give citizen voice some bite.
Notes
* This article is a substantially abridged version of  a study originally 
prepared as a background paper for the 2016 World Development 
Report (Peixoto and Fox 2015). This longer version includes the 
full database of  cases studied, including the rationale for coding the 
cases and data sources for each case. Thanks very much to Brendan 
Halloran and Rosie McGee for their precise comments on an earlier 
version.
1 This also included an international platform, Change.org. The data 
analysis in that case referred to a total of  132 countries (World Bank 
2014b).
2 Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and 
the Omidyar Network.
3 The current enthusiasm – among development stakeholders and the 
media – over the potential of  technology in citizen participation in the 
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developing world is reminiscent of  the wave of  optimism surrounding 
such initiatives in Europe over the past decade, despite the 
significantly less favourable conditions of  developing countries. Even 
in Europe, with generous funding and a more favourable institutional 
and technological context, most experiences present limited results at 
best (see, for instance, Prieto-Martín, de Marcos and Martínez 2011; 
Susha and Grönlund 2014; Diecker and Galan 2014).
4 Note that this widely assumed causal mechanism does not distinguish 
explicitly between two different kinds of  accountability – preventative 
(reforms that make future transgressions more transparent) and 
reactive (answerability and the possibility of  sanctions).
5 Note that this usage differs somewhat from the dichotomy between 
‘individual action = user/client/beneficiary’ and ‘collective action 
= citizen’. The terms as used here recognise that citizens can 
express voice as individuals, but suggests that for citizen action 
to be considered civic it should be public and collective (though 
possibly anonymous – as in the case of  voting). For a comprehensive 
discussion, see Cornwall (2002), among others.
6 Virgilio Reyes, summary of  statistics sent to author, personal 
communication, 17 November 2014.
7 We do not assess, however, levels of  budget execution.
8 In the case of  MajiVoice, for instance, degrees of  responsiveness 
can be explained by the modality of  contracts between government 
and service providers (renewable upon performance) as well as the 
creation of  an oversight structure to monitor government response. 
See Belcher and Abreu-Lopes (2016, forthcoming).
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